

Quantum hashing via ϵ -universal hashing constructions, Freivald's fingerprinting schemas and error correcting codes

Farid Ablyayev Marat Ablyayev

Theory Days at Ratnieki 2014

October, 2014

The talk is based on papers:

- 1 F. Ablyev, A. Vasiliev : Cryptographic quantum hashing, Laser Physics Letters Volume 11 Number 2, 2014
- 2 F. Ablyev, M. Ablyev : Quantum Hashing via Classical epsilon-universal Hashing Constructions, 2014 arXiv:1404.1503 [quant-ph] (2014)
- 3 F. Ablyev, M. Ablyev : Quantum Hashing via ϵ -universal Hashing Constructions and Freivalds Fingerprinting Schemas, Springer LNCS volume 8614, Proceedings of the 16th International Workshop on Descriptive Complexity of Formal Systems, (DCFS), 42-52 p., 2014.

Motivation

- P. Shor 1994. Quantum algorithm for integer factorization.
- “Post-quantum cryptography” <http://pqcrypto.org/>
The book: Daniel J. Bernstein, Johannes Buchmann, Erik Dahmen (editors). Post-quantum cryptography. Springer, 2009.
 - ...
 - Hash-based signature schemes such as L. Lamport signatures and R. Merkle signature schemes.
- Hashing itself is an important basic concept for the organization transformation and reliable transmission of information.
 - In 1995 A. Wigderson characterizes universal hashing as being a tool which “should belong to the fundamental bag of tricks of every computer scientist”.

ϵ -Universal Hash Family

Σ^k, Σ^m – sets of words. $|\Sigma^k| = K, |\Sigma^m| = M$.

A hash function is a map $f : \Sigma^k \rightarrow \Sigma^m$ with $K > M$.

ϵ -Universal hash family

A hash family $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_N\}$ is called ϵ -Universal, if for any two distinct words w, w' :

$$|\{f \in F : f(w) = f(w')\}| \leq \epsilon N.$$

F – ϵ -U ($N; K, M$)

ϵ -Universal Hash Family. Probabilistic approach

Property

Let \mathcal{F} be an ϵ -Universal hash family. If the $f \in \mathcal{F}$ is chosen uniformly at random, then the probability that any two distinct words collide under f is at most ϵ .

- The parameter ϵ is often referred to as the collision probability of the hash family \mathcal{F} .
- The case of $\epsilon = 1/N$ is known as universal hashing.

Quantum function

- Mathematically. Qubit

$$|\psi\rangle = a_0|0\rangle + a_1|1\rangle, \quad \|\psi\|^2 = |a_0|^2 + |a_1|^2 = 1$$

is a unit vector in the two-dimensional Hilbert complex space \mathcal{H}^2 .

- $(\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes s} = \mathcal{H}^2 \otimes \dots \otimes \mathcal{H}^2$ – (2^s) -dimensional Hilbert space of s qubits

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{2^s} a_i|i\rangle, \quad \|\psi\|^2 = 1.$$

Quantum (classical-quantum) function

$$\psi : \mathbb{X} \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes s}, \quad \psi : w \mapsto |\psi(w)\rangle \quad (\psi : |0\rangle, w \mapsto |\psi(w)\rangle).$$

Quantum function. Example

- Word (binary) $w = w_0 \dots w_{k-1}$.
- Number $w = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} w_i 2^i$.

$$0 \leq w \leq 2^k - 1.$$

Example


$$\psi : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \mathcal{H}^2$$

$$\psi : w \mapsto |\psi(w)\rangle$$

$$|\psi(w)\rangle = a_0(w)|0\rangle + a_1(w)|1\rangle =$$


$$|\psi(w)\rangle = \cos\left(\frac{2\pi w}{2^k}\right) |0\rangle + \sin\left(\frac{2\pi w}{2^k}\right) |1\rangle,$$

Computational model



$|\psi(\mathbf{w})\rangle$ – one qubit

$$|\psi(\mathbf{w})\rangle = \cos \theta |0\rangle + \sin \theta |1\rangle = \cos \left(\frac{2\pi \mathbf{w}}{2^k} \right) |0\rangle + \sin \left(\frac{2\pi \mathbf{w}}{2^k} \right) |1\rangle,$$



δ -Resistant $(|\Sigma^k|, \mathbf{s})$ quantum function


Definition

$$\psi : \Sigma^k \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes \mathbf{s}}$$

δ -Resistant $(|\Sigma^k|, \mathbf{s})$ function, if for different words $\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{w}' \in \Sigma^k$

$$|\langle \psi(\mathbf{w}) | \psi(\mathbf{w}') \rangle| \leq \delta.$$

Computational model – Quantum Branching Program – quantum case of Algebraic Branching Program



Lamport digital one bit signature (Quantum variant)

- 1 **Alice** secretly selects
 - a word $\mathbf{w} = \sigma_1 \dots \sigma_k$ for the bit **0**
 - a word $\mathbf{v} = \sigma'_1 \dots \sigma'_k$ for the bit **1**.
- 2 **Alice** prepares two pairs (quantum state and a classical bit):

$$(|\psi(\mathbf{w})\rangle, \mathbf{0}) \quad \text{and} \quad (|\psi(\mathbf{v})\rangle, \mathbf{1})$$

by preparing states $\psi : |\mathbf{0}\rangle, \mathbf{w} \mapsto |\psi(\mathbf{w})\rangle$ and $\psi : |\mathbf{0}\rangle, \mathbf{v} \mapsto |\psi(\mathbf{v})\rangle$

- 3 **Alice** sends pairs $(|\psi(\mathbf{w})\rangle, \mathbf{0})$ and $(|\psi(\mathbf{v})\rangle, \mathbf{1})$ to **Bob**.
Bob keeps these pairs.
- 4
 - **Alice** decided to sign the bit **1**. Then
 - **Alice** sends (classical) pair $(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{1})$ to **Bob**.
- 5 **Bob** Reverse $|\psi(\mathbf{v})\rangle$ using the word \mathbf{v} and get a quantum state $|\psi\rangle$.
Bob verify whether $|\psi\rangle = |\mathbf{0}\rangle$.

Lower bound for \mathbf{s} for δ -Resistant $(|\Sigma^k|, \mathbf{s})$ quantum function

Theorem (Lower Bound)

If $\psi : \Sigma^k \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes \mathbf{s}}$ is δ -Resistant $(|\Sigma^k|, \mathbf{s})$ quantum function then

$$\mathbf{s} \geq \log k + \log \log |\Sigma| - \log \log \left(1 + \sqrt{2/(1 - \delta)} \right) - 1.$$

$$\| |\psi\rangle - |\psi'\rangle \|^2 = \| |\psi\rangle \|^2 + \| |\psi'\rangle \|^2 - 2\langle \psi | \psi' \rangle = 2 - 2\langle \psi | \psi' \rangle.$$

Property

If ψ is δ -Resistant, then for \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{w}'

$$\rho(|\psi(\mathbf{w})\rangle, |\psi(\mathbf{w}')\rangle) = \| |\mathbf{w}\rangle - |\mathbf{w}'\rangle \| \geq \sqrt{2(1 - \delta)}.$$

δ -R ($|\Sigma^k|$, \mathbf{s}) Quantum hash function

Definition

We call δ -Resistant ($|\Sigma^k|$, \mathbf{s}) quantum function ψ a δ -R ($|\Sigma^k|$, \mathbf{s}) Quantum hash function

Quantum function generated by classical function.

Example

Word $\mathbf{w} = w_0 \dots w_{k-1}$, number $w = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} w_i 2^i$

$$h : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^k}, \quad h(\mathbf{w}) = w$$

Function h generates quantum function

$$\psi_h : \mathbf{w} \mapsto |\psi_h(\mathbf{w})\rangle$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_h(\mathbf{w})\rangle &= a_0(\mathbf{w})|0\rangle + a_1(\mathbf{w})|1\rangle = \\ &= \cos\left(\frac{2\pi h(\mathbf{w})}{2^k}\right) |0\rangle + \sin\left(\frac{2\pi h(\mathbf{w})}{2^k}\right) |1\rangle \end{aligned}$$

Quantum function generated by classical function

Discrete function $g : \Sigma^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$

Let $\ell \geq 1$. Quantum function

$$\psi_g : \Sigma^k \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes \ell}$$

determined by the rule

$$\psi_g : \mathbf{w} \mapsto |\psi_g(\mathbf{w})\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{2^\ell} \alpha_i(g(\mathbf{w})) |i\rangle,$$

amplitudes $\alpha_i(g(\mathbf{w}))$, $i \in \{1, \dots, 2^\ell\}$ of the state $|\psi_g(\mathbf{w})\rangle$ determined by $g(\mathbf{w})$,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2^\ell} |\alpha_i(g(\mathbf{w}))|^2 = 1.$$

Quantum function generated by a family of functions.

Example

Binary word $\mathbf{w} = w_0 \dots w_{k-1}$, number $w = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} w_i 2^i$, $b_j \in \mathbb{F}_q$.

Family $H = \{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$

$$h_j(w) = b_j w \pmod{q}.$$

Quantum function $\psi_{h_j} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \mathcal{H}^2$ generated by $h \in H$

$$|\psi_{h_j}(\mathbf{w})\rangle = \cos \frac{2\pi h_j(\mathbf{w})}{q} |0\rangle + \sin \frac{2\pi h_j(\mathbf{w})}{q} |1\rangle$$

Quantum function $\psi_H : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes (\log T + 1)}$ generated by H

$$|\psi_H(\mathbf{w})\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{T}} \sum_{j=1}^T |j\rangle |\psi_{h_j}(\mathbf{w})\rangle =$$

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}} \sum_{j=1}^T |j\rangle \left(\cos \frac{2\pi h_j(\mathbf{w})}{q} |0\rangle + \sin \frac{2\pi h_j(\mathbf{w})}{q} |1\rangle \right).$$

Quantum fingerprinting (2001) = binary quantum hash function

H. Buhrman, R. Cleve, J. Watrous, and R. de Wolf

- Let $E : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be an (n, k, d) error correcting code with Hamming distance $d \geq n - \delta n$.
- Family $E = \{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$, here $E_i(w)$ – i -th bit of code word.

Quantum hash function $\psi_{FE} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes s}$,

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_{FE}(w) &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{i=1}^n |i\rangle |E_i(w)\rangle = \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{i=1}^n |i\rangle \left(\cos \frac{\pi E_i(w)}{2} |0\rangle + \sin \frac{\pi E_i(w)}{2} |1\rangle \right),\end{aligned}$$

Property

For $s = \log n + 1$, $\delta \geq (1 - d/n)$ function ψ_{FE} is an δ -R $(2^k, s)$ quantum hash function.

“Non binary” quantum hash function (2008)

F. Abelayev, A. Vasiliev

\mathbb{F}_q – finite field, q – prime power. $H = \{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$ where

$$h_j : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q \quad h_j(w) = b_j w \pmod{q}.$$

For $s = \log T + 1$ Quantum function $\psi_H : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes s}$,

$$|\psi_H(w)\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{T}} \sum_{j=1}^T |j\rangle \left(\cos \frac{2\pi h_j(w)}{q} |0\rangle + \sin \frac{2\pi h_j(w)}{q} |1\rangle \right).$$

Property (Abelayev, Vasiliev 2013)

For $\delta > 0$, for $T = \lceil (2/\delta^2) \ln(2q) \rceil$, for $s = \log T + 1$ there **exists** a family

$$H_{\delta,q} = \{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$$

such that $\psi_{H_{\delta,q}}$ is an δ -R (q, s) quantum hash function.

Quantum hash generator

Let $\mathbf{G} = \{g_1, \dots, g_D\}$ be a family of functions $g_j : \Sigma^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$. Let $\ell \geq 1$ be an integer and $\psi_{g_j}, j \in \{1, \dots, D\}$, be a quantum functions

$$\psi_{g_j} : \Sigma^k \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^\ell,$$

determined by $g_j \in \mathbf{G}$. Let $d = \log D$. We define a quantum function

$$\psi_{\mathbf{G}} : \Sigma^k \rightarrow (\mathcal{H}^2)^{\otimes(d+\ell)}$$

by the rule

$$\psi_{\mathbf{G}}(\mathbf{w}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{D}} \sum_{j=1}^D \underbrace{|j\rangle}_d \underbrace{|\psi_{g_j}(\mathbf{w})\rangle}_\ell.$$

We call \mathbf{G} a δ -R $(|\Sigma^k|, d + \ell)$ quantum hash generator, if $\psi_{\mathbf{G}}$ is an δ -R $(|\Sigma^k|, d + \ell)$ quantum hash function.

Examples of quantum hash generator

Binary

For binary (n, k, d) error correcting code $E : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ with Hamming distance d the following is true.

For $\delta = 1 - d/n$ The family

$$E = \{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$$

is δ -R $(2^k, \log n + 1)$ quantum hash generator

Non binary

For $\delta > 0$, for q prime power, for $T = \lceil (2/\delta^2) \ln(2q) \rceil$ there exists a set

$$H_{\delta,q} = \{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$$

which is an δ -R $(q, \log T + 1)$ quantum hash generator.

Quantum hashing via classical hashing constructions

- Let $F = \{f_1, \dots, f_N\}$ be an ϵ -U $(N; |\Sigma^k|, q)$ hash family

$$f_j : \Sigma^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q.$$

- Let $H = \{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$

$$h_j : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q.$$

be an δ -R $(q, \log T + \ell)$ quantum hash generator.

- Define composition $G = F \circ H$ of families F and H

$$G = \{g_{ij}(w) = h_j(f_i(w)) : i \in \{1, \dots, N\}, j \in \{1, \dots, T\}\},$$

Theorem

$G = F \circ H$ is an Δ -R $(|\Sigma^k|, s)$ quantum hash generator, where

$$\Delta \leq \epsilon + \delta \quad \text{and} \quad s = \log N + \log T + \ell.$$

Quantum hashing based on Freivalds' fingerprinting 1979

For $w \in \{0, 1\}^k$ (also $w \in \mathbb{F}_{2^k}$), for the i -th prime p_i a function

$$f_i : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p_i} \quad f_i(w) = w \pmod{p_i}.$$

is a fingerprint of w .

Freivalds 1979

- Pick $c > 1$, pick $M = ck \ln k$.
- $\pi(M)$ – the number of primes less than or equal to M .
- $\pi(M) \sim M / \ln M$ as $M \rightarrow \infty$.
- The set

$$F_M = \{f_1, \dots, f_{\pi(M)}\}$$

of fingerprints is a $(1/c)$ -U $(\pi(M); 2^k, M)$ hash family.

Quantum hashing based on Freivalds' fingerprinting

Theorem

- 1 Let $c > 1$, let $M = ck \ln k$. Let $F_M = \{f_1, \dots, f_{\pi(M)}\}$ be a $(1/c)$ -U $(\pi(M); 2^k, M)$ hash family.
- 2 Let $q \in \{M, \dots, 2M\}$ be a prime, let $\delta > 0$. Let $H_{\delta,q} = \{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$ be an δ -R $(q, \log T + 1)$ quantum hash generator.

Then family $G = F_M \circ H_{\delta,q}$ is a Δ -R $(2^k; s)$ quantum hash generator, where

$$\Delta \leq \frac{1}{c} + \delta \quad s \leq \log ck + \log \log k + \log \log q + 2 \log 1/\delta + 3.$$

Lower bound

$$s \geq \log k + \log \log q - \log \log \left(1 + \sqrt{2/(1 - \delta)} \right) - 1.$$

Quantum hashing from universal linear hash family

1979-1980

Let $k > 0$ – integer, q – prime power, $\mathbb{X} = (\mathbb{F}_q)^k \setminus \{(0, \dots, 0)\}$.

For every vector $\mathbf{a} \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^k$ define hash function $f_{\mathbf{a}} : \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ by the rule

$$f_{\mathbf{a}}(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{i=1}^k a_i w_i.$$

Then

$$F_{lin} = \{f_{\mathbf{a}} : \mathbf{a} \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^k\}$$

is an $(1/q)$ -U $(q^k; (q^k - 1); q)$ hash family (universal hash family).

Quantum hashing from universal linear hash family

Theorem

For arbitrary $\delta \in (0, 1)$ composition $\mathbf{G} = F_{lin} \circ H_{\delta, q}$ is a Δ -R ($q^k; s$) quantum hash generator with $\Delta \leq (1/q) + \delta$ and

$$s \leq k \log q + \log \log q + 2 \log 1/\delta + 3.$$

Lower bound

$$s \geq \log k + \log \log q - \log \log \left(1 + \sqrt{2/(1 - \delta)} \right) - 1.$$

This lower bound shows that the quantum hash function $\psi_{\mathbf{G}}$ is not asymptotically optimal in the sense of number of qubits used for the construction.

Quantum hash functions based on error correcting codes

Theorem

Let \mathcal{C} – be a linear $[n, k, d]_q$ ECC

$$\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{F}_q^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^n.$$

Then for arbitrary $\delta \in (0, 1)$ there exists Δ -R $(q^k; \mathbf{s})$ quantum hash generator \mathbf{G} , where

$$\Delta = (1 - d/n) + \delta,$$

$$\mathbf{s} \leq \log n + \log \log q + 2 \log 1/\delta + 4.$$

Proof idea. Having $[n, k, d]_q$ ECC \mathcal{C} one can construct $(1 - d/n)$ -U $(n; q^k; q)$ hash family $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{C}}$. J. Bierbrauer, T. Johansson, G. Kabatianskii, B. Smeets 1994

Quantum hash functions based on $[n, k, d]_q$ RS-code

q – prime power, $k \leq n \leq q$. A common special case is $n = q - 1$. Each word $w \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^k$, $w = w_0 w_1 \dots w_{k-1}$ associated with the polynomial

$$P_w(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} w_i x^i.$$

$$C_{RS} : (\mathbb{F}_q)^k \rightarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^n \quad w \mapsto C_{RS}(w) = (P_w(1) \dots P_w(n))$$

$(k-1)/q$ -U $(q; \mathbb{F}_q^k; q)$ hash family $F_{RS} = \{f_a : a \in A\}$ For $a \in \mathbb{F}_q \setminus 0$ define f_a

$$f_a : (\mathbb{F}_q)^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q \quad f_a(w_0 \dots w_{k-1}) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} w_i a^i.$$

Quantum hash functions based on Reed-Solomon codes

Theorem.

Let q be a prime power and let $1 \leq k \leq q$. Then for arbitrary $\theta \in (0, 1)$ there is a δ -R (q^k, \mathbf{s}) quantum hash generator G_{RS} such that $\delta \leq \frac{k-1}{q} + \theta$ and $\mathbf{s} \leq \log(k \log q) + 2 \log 1/\theta + 4$.

- If we select $n \in [ck, c'k]$ for constants $c < c'$, then $\Delta \leq 1/c + \delta$ for $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and

$$\mathbf{s} \leq \log(q \log q) + 2 \log 1/\Delta + 4.$$

Lower bound

$$\mathbf{s} \geq \log(q \log q) - \log \log \left(1 + \sqrt{2/(1 - \Delta)} \right) - \log c'/2$$

Thus, Reed Solomon codes provides good enough parameters for resistance value Δ and for a number \mathbf{s} of qubits we need to construct quantum hash function ψ_{RS} .

Explicit constructions of G_{RS} and $\psi_{G_{RS}}$.

Let $H_{\delta,q} = \{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$, where $h_j : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $T = \lceil (2/\delta^2) \ln 2q \rceil$.
composition

$$G_{RS} = F_{RS} \circ H_{\delta,q} = \{g_{ji} = h_j(f_{a_i}) : j \in [T], i \in [n]\}$$

For $s = \log n + \log T + 1$ defines function $\psi_{G_{RS}}$ for a word $\mathbf{w} \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^k$ by the rule.

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_{G_{RS}}(\mathbf{w}) &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{i=1}^n |i\rangle \otimes \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}} \sum_{j=1}^T |j\rangle |\psi_{g_{ji}}(\mathbf{w})\rangle \right). \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{nT}} \sum_{i=1, j=1}^{n, T} \underbrace{|i\rangle |j\rangle}_{\log n + \log T} \otimes \underbrace{\left(\cos \frac{2\pi h_j(f_{a_i}(\mathbf{w}))}{q} |0\rangle + \sin \frac{2\pi h_j(f_{a_i}(\mathbf{w}))}{q} |1\rangle \right)}_{|\psi_{g_{ji}}(\mathbf{w})\rangle - \text{one qubit}}. \end{aligned}$$