Deleuze, Kant, and the Question of Metacritique

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The philosophical work of Deleuze, it will be argued here, represents the latest flowering of the project, begun in the immediate wake of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, to complete consistently the 'Copernican revolution' in philosophy. Contrary to appearances, the Copernican turn—the proposal to solve the problems of philosophy by assuming that "objects must conform to our cognition," rather than vice versa— is a living presence in Deleuze's work, perhaps even more so than for many other contemporary philosophers. Several times in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze speaks of carrying forward and completing the Copernican revolution; in particular, he writes of "a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept." In a sense, the peculiarity of Deleuze's philosophical work, its strangely classical style, and its apparent lack of the contemporary sine qua non of irony, comes from its direct continuation of the Kantian turn. It revolves in the orbit of eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophy. Deleuze's attacks on Kant and Hegel are therefore reminiscent of the attacks of the post-Kantians on Kant; they arise from a deep proximity to their objects.

Kant had subjected philosophy to a Copernican turn by constructing a critique that grounded and provided limits for all possible claims of cognition and action. The right to this critique was secured by his claim to have secured the 'highest principles' of a priori cognition (CPR A150-158/B190-197). However, an unease quickly developed in young philosophers such as Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel that, while the 'spirit' of Kant's critique was legitimate, the 'letter' was inadequate. The critical project lacked the method it deserved if it really was to

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provide the ‘highest principles’. Schelling wrote to Hegel in 1795, “Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. The premises are still missing. And who can understand results without premises?”

The post-Kantians therefore aimed to perform what we can call a metacritique. It had to be questioned whether the Kantian critique itself was as pure or ‘immanent’ as it could have been. In order to conduct a thoroughgoing critique of the claims of cognition, one must presumably proceed from a secure standpoint. But, as Hegel famously argued, if the critique of cognition was itself to be conducted by means of cognition, then it was incoherent to demand a separate or transcendent cognitive standpoint.

How can we justify with our cognitive faculties that the very elements Kant uses for his critique of the cognitive faculties are the correct elements for such a critique? In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had relied upon assumptions about the nature of cognition that had had to remain unavowed: for instance, the assertion of differences in kind between sensibility and understanding, or between theoretical and practical cognition, as well as stipulations about the nature of judgment. On the one hand, the post-Kantians intended to remain faithful to the central claim of Kant’s Copernican turn (that “objects must conform to our cognition”), while on the other hand, they were committed to eradicating all the presuppositions that hampered the purity of Kantian critique. The goal of conceiving a thoroughgoing critique of cognition without presupposing anything essential about cognition in the process was essential to the search for a successful metacritique. The post-Kantians realized, however, that if a metacritique was to be successful, then it could only be through attaining a self-grounding apriority that would surely no longer simply be critique, but philosophy itself. For them, the key to this move was to deepen Kant’s notion of transcendental apperception, or self-consciousness. On that basis, the true attainment of first principles could be achieved through a genetic and systematic approach, rather than through the procedure of finding conditions. In Hegel, the articulation of a metacritically self-grounded system via the notion of self-consciousness permitted the legitimation of a new, post-Kantian absolute.

My claim will be that Deleuze attempts a new resolution of the problem of metacritique that proceeds through an attempt to uncover genuine metacritical resources in Kant’s own project. My first step will therefore be to outline what, from Deleuze’s point of view, is the fundamental methodology of the Kantian project. I suggest that shedding light on this can produce some unexpected leverage in dealing with Hegel’s articulation of the question of metacritique. Deleuze’s work, moreover, makes possible the foregrounding of three elements in Kant’s critique.
that, if taken seriously, may help to undermine the post-
Kantian attempt to make self-consciousness the sole key to
metacritique. The first element is Kant’s theory of the “essential
ends of reason,” which plays an important part in the metho-
dology of the critical project. The second element is his notion of
‘transcendental reflection’, which has little to do with the notion
of self-conscious reflection as it is developed by the post-
Kantians. The third element is Kant’s much maligned notion of
‘faculty’, which undergoes an unlikely revival in Deleuze’s
reading.

My second step in the essay, however, will be to indicate that
this reading of Kant’s critical project cannot alone produce a
successful Kantian riposte to the question of metacritique but
can nevertheless serve the ulterior purpose of making possible
Deleuze’s own metacritical transformation and expansion of the
critical project. Kant’s theory of ‘reason’ must be reformulated
as a theory of ‘problems’; transcendentnal reflection must find its
full development in the Deleuzian notion of ‘transcendental
empiricism’, while the faculties must be given a more radical
autonomy than Kant was prepared to grant them. These ele-
ments combine to make Deleuze’s main philosophical work,
_Difference and Repetition_, a

If what I am claiming is true, then why doesn’t Deleuze
himself ever use the word ‘metacritique’? He seems rather more
occupied with another, perhaps vaguer, metaphilosophical
category, that of _immanence_, and he seems to hold Spinoza to be
the philosopher who best expresses the claims of _immanence_.
However, there are reasons to believe that, despite appearances,
Deleuze’s ‘Spinozism’ rests ultimately in the service of a basic
post-Kantian framework. Indeed, the term ‘immanence’ itself
only comes to life in and after Kantianism; one does not find it
thematized in Spinoza. I would suggest that the notion of
metacritique is a clearer way of describing what is at stake for
Deleuze than the rather undetermined notion of ‘immanence’.
It is true that the Kantian notion of immanence is usually _not_
taken in a metacritical sense; Kant’s main use of the notion of
immanence refers to the issue of whether syntheses are _used_ (or
exercised) within their legitimate domain. But the issue of
whether and how these criteria for immanent use are _themselves_ procured immanently _is_ the issue of metacritique.
The post-Kantians’ problem is that the criteria for immanence
in Kant are not transparently immanent criteria, which is why
they ask for the criteria of immanence themselves to be
generated immanently. So one can infer that it is the notion of
metacritique that formally articulates what the conditions of a
successful philosophy of immanence are. Deleuze’s philosophical project is first delineated in a 1954 review of Jean Hyppolite’s study of Hegel, *Logic and Existence*, in which Hyppolite claims that “immanence is complete” only finally in Hegel. In response to Hyppolite, Deleuze attempts to produce a philosophy of immanence that is more complete than Hegel’s, precisely by excavating the occluded metacritical dimension in Kant’s philosophy.

This essay goes against the current of some recent trends in the interpretation of Deleuze’s work. On one reading, Deleuze’s criteria for a successful philosophy of immanence come down to a question of *power*. Only an evaluation of the degrees and types of power at work in a ‘mode of existence’ can provide us with a truly immanent means to ‘critique’ that existence. Spinoza and Nietzsche provide all the speculative and practical means one needs to construct such a “plane of immanence.” In support of this interpretation, Deleuze himself remarks that all of his early work “tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche equation.” On another reading, Bergson’s biophilosophy provides the ultimate framework for Deleuzian immanence. In support of this interpretation, Deleuze’s letter to Arnaud Villani can be cited: “I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician ... Bergson says that modern science hasn’t found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that interests me.” In what follows, I take *Difference and Repetition* as Deleuze’s major philosophical statement, and I treat all his earlier works in the history of philosophy as steps toward that statement. If this position is taken, problems ensue for the interpretations just mentioned, as the Spinozist-Nietzschean theory of power and affect plays only a minimal role in *Difference and Repetition*, while similarly the discussion of Bergson is largely restricted there to the account of the synthesis of memory. While my Kantian interpretation is not intended to adequately represent all aspects of *Difference and Repetition*, it is intended to articulate the ultimate, meta-theoretical framework for Deleuze’s philosophical work up to and including that book. It may even extend further, for as late as 1978, in a lecture on Kant, we find Deleuze remarking that “we are all Kantians.” If, then, Deleuze does return to Spinoza and Bergson, it is to find resources that can productively develop the problems we face in a fundamentally post-Kantian modernity. A simple regression to a precritical kind of metaphysics was never on the cards: that could only be a compensatory act in the wake of the destruction of metaphysics and the “speculative death of God” wrought by Kant (*DR* 87). Today, this regression is most likely to take the form of the affirmation of various kinds of metaphysical materialism. To begin, then, let us return to the inaugural site of Kantian modernity, the moment of the speculative death of God.
1.

In order to uncover the response Kant might have made to the question of metacritique posed by the post-Kantians, we must in any case return to the originary impetus that led Kant toward the project for a critique. Understanding this will prepare us to appreciate Deleuze's interpretation, in his Kant's Critical Philosophy, of the metaphilosophical structure of the Critique of Pure Reason.

The breakthrough in the critical project is usually taken to be outlined in Kant's letter of 21 February 1772 to Marcus Herz, where Kant realizes that he has no justification for assuming that the pure concepts of the understanding used by the intellect have any relation at all to objects. "Our understanding, through its representations, is neither the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends), nor is the object the cause of our intellectual representations in the real sense (in sensu reali) ... [But] if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects?" He concludes that "the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics" is the answer to the question "what is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object [Gegenstand]?") The purely passive reception of appearances does not account for the a priori intellectual elements of knowledge, nor can the intellect delve behind the sensible curtain of the object in an act of intellectual intuition and identify the thought of a noumenal substance with anything in the domain of appearance. Hence the pure understanding and the object cannot be causally related to each other or, more simply, cannot affect each other. Here the stage for the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason is clearly being set. As Wolfgang Carl says, "the deduction must explain a non-causal relation between representations and their objects ... the special case in which the understanding may form for itself concepts of things completely a priori, with which concepts of things must necessarily agree." But while Carl has argued that in the 1772 letter Kant is referring to the critical problem of the relation of pure concepts to the sensible world, L. W. Beck has rightly pointed out that the issue of the letter is not yet that of the applicability of a priori concepts to sensible objects but "the problem of how there can be apriori knowledge of intelligibilia without intellectual intuition." The Gegenstände of pure understanding are in fact the thoughts of such entities as noumenal substances and God, the 'proper objects' of the intellect. The crisis of reference that is the topic of the 1772 letter thus marks equally a crisis in the legitimacy of the content of "intellectual representations." It amounts to a "speculative death of God," in that knowledge of the existence of God becomes strictly off-limits for human beings.
The result of this double crisis would appear to be that thought is left radically autonomous, at most an “inner activity,” having no direct relation to anything immediate at all. The project of the Critique of Pure Reason would seem to follow directly: intellectual representations are illegitimate unless related to the structure of empirical cognition, based on empirical intuitions. Pure reason must be held in check and correctly used if it is not to breed paralogisms, antinomies, and theological illusions. However, such a general impression would crucially overshoot the mark. Having renounced Leibnizian rationalism for the path of critique, Kant nevertheless does not abandon completely the principle that there are rational principles or rules to which minds must necessarily conform, independent of the relation of those principles to experience. First, of course, Kant subtracts the discipline of logic entirely from empirical and metaphysical determination (CPR A153/B192). Second, Kant argues that there are certain nonlogical conditions that are necessary for thought as such and not just for experience. In his precritical incarnation, Kant had argued that concepts of God and world (as actual totality) were a priori concepts that applied directly to noumena. The critical turn, of course, took the ground away from such ontological claims and gave God and world at most ‘regulative’ status as ‘Ideas’ (cf. CPR A644/B672). But that the concepts of God and world are now regulative is not simply to be taken as a deflationary claim: to say they are necessary conditions of thought is still very significant. The whole of the second half of the Critique is taken up with ascertaining the precise status of necessary conditions of thought, and with ensuring that these subjective conditions are not taken as ontologically objective. “One can place all illusion in the taking of a subjective condition for the cognition of an object” (CPR A396).

Both logic and the Ideas are thus presented as necessary conditions of thought; today we might say that they are normative conditions for rationality. They therefore must have some privilege in the order of reasons of the critical project. But look now at how the entire Critique is structured in terms of a teleology of reason—a fact all too often neglected but that Deleuze makes central to his interpretation. Kant claims that reason has a “single supreme and inner end, which first makes possible the whole” (CPR A833/B861) and that “philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae) (CPR A839/B897). Reason itself, then, has certain intrinsic ends that orient the path of critique. Kant never put in question the intrinsic and essential nature of these ends, which refer us back to claims in his precritical writings about “the natural character of reason.”
But do the normative requirements of logic and an intrinsic rational goal of unifying all concepts permit us to make an advance on the problem that inaugurates Kant’s critical period: the problem of the reference of intellectual representations? These are, after all, merely formal requirements for rational activity. Nevertheless, Deleuze suggests that this minimal beginning does indeed clear a path for the setting in motion of a critique of pure reason.

There are interests of reason, but reason turns out to be the only judge of its own interests. The ends or interests of reason cannot be justified in terms of experience, or of any other authority outside or above reason.... An immanent critique—reason as judge of reason—is the essential principle of the so-called transcendental method. This method sets out to determine: 1. the true nature of reason’s interests or ends; and 2. the means of realising those interests.22

The primary stage in the generation of Kant’s critique must be formulated in terms of the question of the realization of the interests or ends of reason. But this question only has sense if the inquiry about how to correctly realize those ends proceeds through a full account of the means to this realization. It is here that the question of the reference of intellectual representations, the crisis of the speculative death of God, returns. The chasm between thought and being that opened up before Kant in 1772 was framed in terms of the loss of intellectual intuition. While we do not have intellectual intuition, we do have another kind of intuition: sensible intuition. Kant’s task, therefore, is to work out exhaustively the nature and range of the limits imposed upon the use of reason by the fact that we have finite minds, that is, by the fact that we are restricted to sensible intuition. An immanent critique, on this understanding, involves reason judging whether it can realize its aims, given a certain refractory material that provides the only medium through which any reference of intellectual representations can be secured.

Kantian critique, therefore, is not, as Hegel suggests, simply the ‘critique of cognition by cognition’, which would indeed entail that it would get caught in a vicious circle before it even begins (unless it jumps in the water). Rather, Kant’s problem is that there is a nature of reason, that there are essential ends of reason, but it is not immediately clear how to fulfil or realize those ends, given the dependency of human reason on sensible intuition. This vector of formal rationality → realization is more essential to what Kant himself means by critique than the expectations for critique one finds in Hegel. Kantian critique will teach us what are the legitimate goals of the different types of cognition available to us and how not to confuse them with each other. (It will make sure,
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for instance, that we do not ascribe actual existence to space
and time or that we do not attempt to know what we must
merely attempt to think, both of which would thwart the
interests of reason.) It only needs to be added that, as Kant’s
critical project develops into the system of three Critiques, the
project of questioning the possibility for realizing reason grows
correspondingly complex. In the Critique of Practical Reason,
for instance, the ends or interests of reason are further divided
into speculative and practical interests.23

The distinction in kind between thought and sensible
intuition is thus founding for Kant. In his Introduction to the
first Critique, Kant begins by pointing out that it is remarkable
that “even among our experiences cognitions are mixed in that
must have their origin apriori” (CPR A2/B5). The components of
this ‘mixture’ can be isolated if we recognize that, although our
understanding is inseparably tied to experience, it also extends
further to claims involving necessity and universality, which
cannot be derived from experience. Although Kant gestures
toward “a common but to us unknown root” of sensibility and
understanding (CPR A15/B29), Deleuze makes a point of insis-
ting that “one of the most original points of Kantianism is the
idea of a difference in nature between our faculties” (KCP 22).24

But we need to know more about the actual procedure by
which the critical philosopher secures access to these cognitive
differences in kind. Kant incorporates an account of the
capacity of distinguishing differences in kind between kinds of
cognition in a special section of the first Critique, the
“Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection.” There he gives this
capacity a name: transcendental reflection. Given that he
signals the methodological primacy of this procedure—“reflection ...
... is the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves
to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive
at concepts” (CPR A260/B316, italics added)—it is essential to
comprehend this first preparatory activity if a dimension of
metacritique is to be discovered in Kant. He begins by sugges-
ting that this process of the distinction in kind of cognitions
and the mutual delimitation issuing from it are preliminary
conditions for undertaking any comparison whatsoever.25 “The
action through which I make the comparison of representa-
tions in general with the cognitive power in which they are
situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to
be compared to one another as belonging to the pure under-
standing or pure intuition, I call transcendental reflection”
(CPR A261/B317). The comparison of representations (their
distinction and relation) cannot proceed without first
identifying the plane on which they are to be compared.
Transcendental reflection concerns the determination of the
“place to which the [distinct] objects of cognition belong” (CPR
A262/B318), a kind of “transcendental topic,” or topography (cf.
A prior transcendental reflection on the topographical appropriateness of a given concept is necessary before it can be successfully used. Let us refer to an example of transcendental reflection. Kant says, “whether things are identical or different, in agreement or in opposition, etc, cannot be established at once from the concepts themselves in mere comparison, but solely by means of transcendental reflection, through distinction of the cognitive faculty to which they belong” (CPR A262/B318). Logical identity, difference and opposition are of a different kind to the identity, difference, and opposition that is valid in the spatiotemporal domain. This claim goes back to the precritical Kant, for whom the distinction between logic and reality (in Leibnizian terms, between the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason) is of more vital importance than the subject-object distinction. In the Negative Magnitudes essay, for instance, Kant argues that in a logical contradiction, one thing cancels another because their concepts are incompatible; furthermore, “the consequence of the logical contradiction is nothing at all.” In a real opposition, by contrast, the cancellation concerns the states of another quantity of reality, and “the consequence is something” (take two forces of equal quantity acting upon each other—they are really opposed, but the result is rest, which is not nothing). The difference between logical and real opposition may be framed as follows: the former involves an affirmation being negated, while the latter involves two positivities or affirmations canceling each other out. The result—zero—may look the same in each case, but in principle they should not be confused.

The peculiar thing about the Amphiboly in the Critique of Pure Reason is that the main opposition at work remains the precritical one between logic and reality. But surely it would be more in keeping with the Critique if differences in kind were rather isolated at the level of sensibility, understanding, and reason, that is, at the level of the faculties. While Kant fails to do this, in what follows I will claim that Deleuze transforms the Kantian diagnostic tool of transcendental reflection into the procedure of ‘transcendental empiricism’ precisely by taking up this possibility. First, though, we must explore Deleuze’s surprising claim that “the doctrine of the faculties forms the real network which constitutes the transcendental method” (KCP 10).

The doctrine of the faculties has not fared well in Kant scholarship, being adduced to a general confusion in Kant’s mind of the question de jure of the necessary conditions of experience with a separate question about the de facto processes responsible for how the mind carries out its syntheses. When Strawson refers to the theory of the faculties as the
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"imaginary subject of transcendental psychology," he appears to speak for most twentieth century philosophers, reared on the critique of psychologism by Frege and Husserl. In *Difference and Repetition*, however, Deleuze criticizes the residual psychologism in Kant's first *Critique* ("Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological consciousness" [DR 135], while simultaneously defending the doctrine of the faculties "despite the fact that it has become discredited today, the doctrine of the faculties is an entirely necessary component of the system of philosophy" [DR 143]). Clearly he does not take discussion of faculties to be necessarily grounded in psychology. Instead he claims that the doctrine of the faculties is the true locus of the transcendental method. He goes on to state that the discredit given to the doctrine of faculties "may be explained by the misrecognition of [a] properly transcendental empiricism, for which was substituted in vain a tracing of the transcendental from the empirical." In the final section I will attempt to explain Deleuze's notion of transcendental empiricism, but first it is necessary to elaborate upon the relationship Deleuze finds between the faculties and the essential ends of reason we discussed in the previous section.

Although he does not give a definition of faculty in *Difference and Repetition*, in the monograph on Kant, Deleuze gives not one but two essential meanings to the concept of faculty, neither of which is psychologistic. These two meanings correspond to the two procedures Deleuze finds at the basis of the critical project. In the first place, the notion of faculty does the work of clarifying what the essential ends of reason must look like for a finite mind. In its second meaning, it allows us to answer how these ends can be realized, given the complex structure of finite minds.

The first meaning of faculty is much broader than that usually conceived and concerns the general ways in which representations relate a subject and an object. There are three faculties in this sense:

- *Knowledge* is relation of representation to the object in terms of agreement.
- *Desire* is relation of representation to object in terms of causality by subject.
- *Pleasure/pain* is the relation of representation to the subject "insofar as it affects the subject by intensifying or weakening its vital force." (*KCP* 4)

Deleuze first points out that it should be obvious that our common experience is composed of varying mixtures of contribution by each of these faculties. There is no pleasure without knowledge, no desire without pleasure, etc. But the real issue for Kantian critique is "knowing whether each of these
faculties—on the basis of the principle in terms of which it is defined—is capable of a higher form. We may say that a faculty has a higher form when it finds in itself the law of its own exercise ... [A] faculty is thus autonomous" (KCP 4). Kant's aim is to bring to light the 'higher forms' of subject-object representation, that is, those representations in which the subject legislates over the object.

For instance, the principle in terms of which the faculty of knowledge is defined is synthesis. That is, knowledge necessarily involves predicking something of a subject-concept which was not already analytically contained there. Moreover, this synthesis of representations necessarily takes the form of a judgment. If the representations in the judgment all have an aposteriori source, then “the faculty of knowledge appears in its lower form” (KCP 5). But if a concept is universally predicated of an object, then a synthetic a priori claim is made, which no longer takes its cue from experience but which makes a rule that conditions experience of that object. The faculty of knowledge in this case legislates over its object; this is the substance of Kant's Copernican turn.31

However, Deleuze makes a further suggestion: “the determination of a higher form of the faculty of knowledge is at the same time the determination of an interest of Reason” (KCP 5). Deleuze is contending here that Kant's discovery of the legislative role of the subject has its basic context within an exposition of a system of ends of reason. So in the case of knowledge, the higher form of the faculty of knowledge "determines" the speculative end or interest of reason for rational beings who are restricted to finite intuition. That is, it determines what the 'object' of the speculative interest of reason in its human realization must be: the scientific study of the universal laws of phenomena. This reading of Kant is much wider in scope than many interpretations, which choose to ignore how Kant conceives of the critical project as determining the synthetic a priori principles of a higher system of philosophy (which, as we saw earlier, is "the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of reason").

The second meaning of faculty denotes a "kind of representation," and, in particular, "a specific source of representations." This is divided as follows:

- **Intuition**: immediate presentational relation; source = sensibility
- **Concept**: mediate representational relation; source = understanding
- **Idea**: concept that can be neither presented nor represented; source = reason.32

This second meaning appears to conform more to the usual meaning, but again it is without psychologistic connotation:
the "sources" of representation are identified by their position with regard to a process of mediatory representation. However, the function of this kind of 'faculty' should be specified in the light of what has been said about the first meaning. We have seen that, for instance, the higher form of the faculty of knowledge corresponds to the speculative interest of reason. However, one of Kant's main points in the first Critique is that if reason itself is put to speculative use, then it will inevitably transcend the limits of experience. (What would reason be if it did not seek the unconditioned, the truth about things in themselves?) Legitimate knowledge for finite beings can only be won by concepts conditioned by intuitions and other concepts. In other words, only the understanding can successfully realize the speculative interest of reason. Here we can see clearly why critique is necessary: the interests of reason are not necessarily realized as one would expect. Because of our finite cognitive structure, these interests are not necessarily directly realized through reason itself. In fact it is only in the practical interest of reason that reason itself legislates. Thus, although we are always impelled to seek the unconditioned through knowledge, the unconditioned is only present in the sphere of knowledge because we allow it to wander from its true place. What is transcendent for knowledge—reason as unconditioned—becomes immanent for practical reason.

We can perhaps now see why the notion of faculty is so important to the general project of critique, when the latter is understood as the project to realize human reason. Schematically, each sense of faculty has three instantiations, and "the three Critiques present a complete system of permutations" (KCP 68). Without an awareness of how to negotiate this system of faculties, we would continually find ourselves posing false problems (such as taking God's existence as a speculative rather than a practical problem) and, consequently, be forever in danger of being lured away from realizing correctly the ends of reason.

However, if Kantian immanent critique is to be able to fully account for itself, it cannot ultimately leave the practical and speculative strands of reason unconnected. At the end of his book on Kant, Deleuze ingeniously and subversively shows how the ends of reason are not only distinguished in kind in the way just outlined but find their ultimate relation through the uncircumventable necessity of transcendental illusion. On the one hand, "understanding and reason are deeply tormented by the ambition to make things in themselves known to us" (KCP 24). This torment, though, is justified and even required by the structure of ends that governs Kant's system. One could never have knowledge without also desiring to know true, unconditioned reality. On the other hand, practical finality is ultimately not enough on its own for right action: Kant acknowledges that
the categorical imperative requires a "ruse of reason" that impels us to practically strive for a final end in which the supersensible space of reason would be realized in this world. Just as we cannot not desire the truth, so also are we committed to the thought that "the concept of freedom ... [can be] realised or accomplished in nature," regardless of the fact that nature will never stop appearing contingent (KCP 74). The irony here, of which Deleuze is fully aware and is poised to use for his own purposes, is that while this ultimate destination of reason would seem to signal precisely the transparent realization of reason that would fulfil the project of the immanent critique of reason, this rational transparency is secured only on pain of reason continuing to deceive itself. Kant's systematic teleology needs the illegitimate transcendent exercise of the faculties—the incursion of the speculative into the practical and vice versa—in order ultimately to provide the highest conditions for their legitimate exercise. This is doubly paradoxical, first because of the basic thought that reason is realized through a ruse, legitimacy secured through illegitimacy, etc., and second because becoming conscious of the necessity of the ruse would also surely undermine one's capability of being sincerely 'duped' by it.

Thus, while keeping the utmost fidelity to Kant's attempt to provide an immanent critique, Deleuze shows at the same time that something has gone amiss somewhere. The problem is isolating where the fault lies. In what follows I will outline how in Difference and Repetition Deleuze tries to root out what leads Kant to "compromise ... the conceptual apparatus of the three Critiques" (DR 136).

3.

From a Deleuzian point of view, we can trace Kant's wrong turn right back to the moment in which intellectual intuition is problematized in 1772. Deleuze agrees with Kant that the intellect loses its ground of reference to its object, as soon as it must depend on the receptivity of intuition. Thought is cast adrift and deprived of immediate relation to intuition. However, when Kant immediately discovers a normative structure for thought (echoing his precritical claims about a "natural character of reason"), he moves too quickly to fill the yawning gap that has opened up before him. Kant is insufficiently critical about the notion of 'reason', which remains underanalyzed and overdetermined; he presupposes that "thought is the natural exercise of a faculty [and] that there is a natural capacity for thought endowed with a talent for truth or affinity with the true" (DR 131). But we cannot presuppose the "upright nature of thought" (DR 131). Rather, faced with the radical problematication of intellectual intuition, that is, with what amounts to the "speculative death of God," the philosopher
should not continue to act like “a particular individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought, but as a singular individual full of ill will [mauvaise volonté], who does not manage to think, either conceptually or naturally” (DR 130, translation modified). The model is rather Kierkegaard’s sinner, unable to overcome his singularity and recognize himself as an actualization of the universal. The crisis in thought should undermine any preestablished harmony between being and thought, any guarantee of thought’s innate capacity to refer to the True.

Deleuze’s complaint against Kant thus concerns the ascription of natural properties to reason. Nevertheless, we also saw that Deleuze takes it as essential to the intelligibility of an immanent critique of reason that reason be able to posit independent ends at the outset of the critical procedure. His goal must therefore be to conceive of a basic normative conception of reason that does not rely on anything natural: a denaturalized reason. Now, as we saw, Kant’s conception of the ideal of rationality takes form in his theory of Ideas. It is this theory that Deleuze exploits in Difference and Repetition, while simultaneously implying that Kant has mischaracterized the theory in certain essential respects. Deleuze’s problem is that Kant depicts the activity and shape of reason too much in terms of the understanding. It is as if Kant has never really shaken off the conflation of reason and understanding he made in his precritical writings. Reason is characterized fundamentally in terms of providing an ultimate collective ground for the distributive activities of the understanding and formally is really little more than an extension of the unifying function of the understanding. Even if Ideas are not determined by the understanding, they still function for the understanding. The cause of the confusion, Deleuze contends, is that Kant did not fully grasp the significance of his own description of Ideas as “problematic” (CPR A254/B310).

Kant never ceased to remind us that Ideas are essentially ‘problematic’. [But] conversely, problems are Ideas. Undoubtedly, he shows that Ideas lead us into false problems, but this is not their most profound characteristic: if, according to Kant, reason does pose false problems and therefore itself gives rise to illusion, this is because in the first place it is the faculty of posing problems in general. (DR 168)

For Kant, Ideas are thoughts that for various structural reasons it is necessary to think (for instance, the existence of God or totality, or the substantiality of the self) but that cannot be synthesized according to the rules of empirical cognition and, hence, are “problematic.” In this sense, Ideas are problematic for experience. However, the Kantian point, emphasized by Deleuze,
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is not that such thoughts should simply be demoted from their previously significant status but that such problematic thoughts are on the contrary so important that we have to work out the correct way to apprehend them, as the error of previous philosophy lay in trying to make them fit into the confines of empirical cognition (thus leading to transcendental illusion). Therefore the concept of God is *misunderstood* if it is treated as the object of knowledge. It rather has its true sense as regulative horizon and as object of faith. Thus the critical project must not primarily be understood as one of limitation and negation but, rather, as producing positive gains, by correctly situating different kinds of cognitive claims. Nevertheless, Deleuze suggests that Kant continues the error of previous philosophy by restricting his fertile conception of Ideas to the three instances of self, world, and God, due to his limited conception of reason. The ‘problems’ of self, world and God only motivate our cognition when we have subordinated it to the understanding (they concern the extreme poles of a world made intelligible by the understanding). But Ideas don’t just exist as problems for an understanding-dominated experience. We saw how Kant calls the process of isolating differences in kind ‘transcendental reflection’. For Kant, mixing the logical and the real could be said to produce a ‘badly stated problem’: if one expects logic to provide answers to questions which concern spatiotemporal reality, one will be disappointed. Deleuze is simply advancing this approach by demanding that the ideal structures that orient all finite cognition and action be identified and situated in such a way that their difference from concepts of empirical cognition is fully appreciated. As we will see, Deleuze thinks there are an indefinite (but probably not large) number of genuine Ideas, and their analysis is by no means confined to philosophy but to theoretical work in general.

First, though, we must turn to Deleuze’s reconstruction of the Kantian system of faculties as a whole. Immediately after the passage on Ideas cited earlier, Deleuze continues that “*in its natural state*, such a faculty [of posing problems] lacks the means to distinguish what is true or false, what is founded or not, in any problem it poses. The aim of the critical operation is precisely to provide this means” (*DR* 168, italics mine). As in the Kant book, the critical project is characterized fundamentally in terms of means and end, the ascent from the supposedly natural yet illusory state to the critical state of self-awareness. But at least two interconnected elements are altered in the new Deleuzian framework. On the one hand, in *Difference and Repetition*, there is only one sense of ‘faculty’. For reasons to be explained below (but obviously connected with the demotion of the understanding), the background framework of subject-object representation disappears, leaving us with a
pure disparity of faculties. For Deleuze, the natural state of a faculty just is its uncriticized mixture with other faculties, while critique initiates the discovery of what is proper to a faculty. On the other hand, however, we are now to understand the goal of critique as the full realization of reason’s power to problematize. The critique of the “natural state” of reason, which involves the isolation of the difference in kind of reason from the other faculties, will thus still facilitate the realization of reason. A ‘destination’ in the Idea still governs the framework, linking the faculties together hierarchically.

However, with this emphasis on the singular activity of faculties, we are no doubt wandering far afield from Kant’s investigation (in the first half of the first Critique) into the ‘transcendental conditions’ for experience in general. Indeed, Deleuze believes the transcendental project actually misfires as soon as “Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of psychological consciousness” (DR 135), a procedure that many might see as the perfect exemplar of a ‘transcendental argument’. In order to make sense of how Deleuze can reject this procedure, yet still remain fundamentally Kantian in direction, we should examine in more detail his critique of the dominance of the understanding. In empirical cognition according to Kant, priority is given to the procedure of recognition, which occurs by means of concepts, which have their source in the understanding. Kant understands a concept as a “function,” that is, as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” (CPR A68/B93). This “unity of the action” is of course grounded in the capacity for the transcendental ‘I think’ to “be able to accompany all my representations” (CPR B131). But the “analytical unity” of any concept (its meaning) also depends on its representational content being “antecedently ... conceived in synthetic unity with other (even if only possible) representations” (CPR B134n). That is, it is essential to concepts that they are “predicates of possible judgments” (CPR A69/B94). Now, part of Kant’s procedure for accounting for the general possibility of synthetic unity is of course to deduce the categories from the logical forms of judgment: these serve as a priori conditions for synthetic unity. But in order for the activities of the understanding to be more than merely “distributive,” that is, to be more than a set of disconnected acts, the coherent relation of the content of the concepts must also be guaranteed. Conceptual content must be perpetually open to amplification by allowing synthetic connection with other concepts, according to the vicissitudes of experience. But in order for these connections to form well ordered inferential networks, Kant holds that the regulative ideal of reason is necessary as a unified horizon of logical representation. Concepts, then, are essentially rules for unifying the presenta-
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tions of sensibility, imagination, and memory according to a consistent logical space of representation.

If we keep this full picture in mind, we can begin to make sense of a somewhat abrupt act of violence that Deleuze commits on the Kantian architecture within which he is working: his denial of the transcendental significance of the faculty of the understanding. “It may be that some well-known faculties—too well-known—turn out to have no proper limit,... because they are imposed and have an exercise only under the form of common sense” (DR 143-4). Deleuze wants to suggest that the understanding is really an abstraction, derived from a particular mode of relating the faculties: what he calls “common sense.” In empirical acts of knowledge, the distinct faculties of cognition are mixed in together so that the distinct contribution of each faculty is obscured and the transcendental 'I think' serves to correlate the disparate data as if to a common, identical object (DR 133). But what is such a 'mixture' but once again the expression of a merely 'natural' state of cognition and precisely not the product of a critical use of the faculties in which each faculty is accorded its special due. If the understanding is intrinsically linked to the exercise of common sense, then it follows that there can be nothing truly transcendental about the understanding. It has no 'higher form'. By giving primacy to recognition in his critique of cognition, Kant thus fails to see that the consequent collective use of all the faculties obscures the distinctive, distributive use of each, which it is precisely the job of the critique to identify and liberate.

But we need to move carefully here, so as to avoid the appearance of sacrificing too much in order to win a completely pure conception of critique. The abolition of the transcendental significance of the faculty of understanding does not collapse the whole Kantian domain of experience but, rather, helps divide it up anew. First, Deleuze wants to claim that a portion of the unifying role of the understanding should by right be handed over to the faculty of memory, which performs a special synthesis of its own and thus has a higher form. But for the purposes of this article, we should focus on another aspect of Deleuze’s redistribution of the work of the faculties, one that arises from an immanent critique of Kant’s position. As we have just seen, “recognition” according to concepts can only function on condition that a unified horizon of representation is presupposed as an ideal. “The identity of the unspecified concept constitutes the form of the Same with regard to recognition” (DR 137). But now what happens if we choose not simply to rely on this “unspecified concept” as an abstract guide for recognition but instead choose to think about or “problematize” the material of our experience? Because we have been working away at reshaping the notion of the Idea, perhaps our anxieties about losing the primacy of the understanding are unwarranted.

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and chaos is not about to ensue. After all, "it is apparent that acts of recognition exist and occupy a large part of our daily life: this is a table, this is an apple, Good morning Theaetetus. But who can believe that the destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that when we recognise, we are thinking?" (DR 135, cf. 71). Deleuze's approach here is to attenuate Kantian claims that recognition should be taken as the model or "image" for cognition in general. He does not want to dispute the necessity of recognition for meaningful cognition—rather he is disputing Kant's claims for its priority in the procedure of critique, the isolation of the transcendental. So when Kant himself says that empirical cognition can only take place under the orientation of Ideas, Deleuze is free to interpret this as another way of saying that one of the governing conditions of cognition is that we are capable of being forced to think about and question our experience.

Deleuze's claim is thus that Kant vitiates his project by not seeing that the understanding is not a faculty in the transcendental sense but arises from a particular ("common") use of the faculties that is itself dominated by an impoverished conception of the capabilities of thought. Thought, on the other hand, is a faculty, whose genuinely rational and problematizing activities (whose "destiny") can only emerge and flourish precisely under a different, critical regime of use of the faculties. There is, says Deleuze, a synthesis of the Idea or problem that is in any case higher than the Kantian synthesis according to concepts. In Kant, a sensation is always taken as an instantiation of a particular concept, which brings with it a train of implications about its relation to other concepts. Now, rather than retreating from the primacy of this Kantian 'as' back into naturalism, Deleuze advances this very conception, which is central to the Copernican turn. Might there not be a way of restoring the enigma of a sensation without returning its status to that of a mere transaction in nature? Might sensation not be 'taken as' the sign of a problem, a sign to be deciphered?^*

Such a reformulation can only work if we lay down a further restriction of the range and validity of conceptual representation. So far it is as if we have been adding pressure on the concept 'from above', from the Idea. But Deleuze also erodes the power of the concept 'from below', from sensible intuition. In the Kant book, Deleuze restricted the meaning of representation to conceptual representation, as we can see in the table for the second sense of 'faculty' discussed earlier. He argued, for instance, that intuitions, by their very immediacy are not representations."What presents itself to us, or what appears in intuition, is initially the phenomenon as sensible empirical diversity (aposteriori)" (KCP 8). However, in Difference and Repetition the point becomes not just that 'representation' is an inadequate characterization of sensibility because of the latter's

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immediacy; it is that a different kind of manifold or "multiplicity" to that of representation *qua* conceptual is involved, one proper to sensibility itself. The proper 'object' of sensibility is really *intensity*, as this cannot be experienced *as such* in the commonsense use of sensibility, which requires sensible intuitions to be quantified and measured as spatiotemporally *extensive* magnitudes and correlated to conceptual recognition.

But as Deleuzian Ideas are not restricted by the procedures of the understanding (for which Ideas are forms of totality), we are at liberty to apply the same point about multiplicity back to the Ideas themselves. Ideas are to be conceived as "pure multiplicities." They are multiplicities that are synthesized *as* problems. The central relation in Deleuze is thus between two poles of multiplicity, which although they fall *outside* conceptual representation, yet can establish, so Deleuze believes, an internal relationship of their own. In Deleuze's reformulation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is not pure intuition that provides the abstract ground for the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding; it is rather the apprehension of intensive sensible signs that puts us on the path of deciphering the Ideas that, in their intrinsic problematicity, govern experience. Each faculty—not just sensibility, but imagination and memory as well—can potentially contribute to the unfolding of an Idea or problem, as long as it is exercised outside the regime of common sense.

It may be objected at this point that we have now lost sight altogether of Kant's central achievement in the Transcendental Analytic: the discovery of transcendental apperception as the ultimate condition for the possibility of experience. However, I would argue that, in its most radical form, Kant's subject of synthesis, the "I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks ... the transcendental subject of thoughts = x" (*CPR* A346/B404) may allow itself to be formulated at a higher level than that of the understanding. When Kant describes it minimally as an "intelligence that is merely conscious of its faculty for combination" (*CPR* B158), the path is open for a wider account of the synthetic (or 'combinatory') activities of the 'transcendental subject' (which, as the above citations show, Kant realized should never be identified with conceptions about the empirical, personal subject). For Deleuze it is the synthesis of Ideas *as problems* that is the essential destination of cognition, not the capacity for recognition. Kant restricted the notion of synthesis to the activities of the understanding, failing to see the vistas he had opened up onto other kinds of synthesis.

Kantianism thus only seems to be turned on its head when Deleuze remarks that "the transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior, or transcendent exercise" (*DR* 143). Such a statement, of course, reads like the most coarse confusion of the Kantian 'transcendental' with the
'transcendent'. However, the first thing to note is that "transcendent in no way means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world" (DR 143). And secondly, we can perhaps see at this juncture that this claim only amplifies what Deleuze says in the Kant book about the "higher form" of faculties being the key to the synthetic a priori. Deleuze's "transcendental empiricism," which is glossed as an "empiricism of the Idea" (DR 278), is thus transcendental precisely because faculties are used transcendentally, that is, in their apriori difference from other faculties. Transcendental empiricism is the name for the very enactment of the critical procedure of isolating, and cognizing according to, fundamental cognitive differences in kind.

Transcendent exercise must not be traced from empirical exercise precisely because it apprehends that which cannot be grasped from the point of view of common sense, that which measures the empirical operation of all the faculties according to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration. That is why the transcendental is answerable to a superior empiricism which alone is capable of exploring its domain and its regions. (DR 143)

We should now take note of an important implication here that can lead us back to the metacritical questions with which we started. At the end of the last section, we saw how Deleuze implicitly criticizes Kant by showing how the Kantian system ends up paradoxically valorizing transcendent exercise in order to achieve the closure of the transcendental system. Perhaps now this paradox looks less threatening, for there is no ruse of reason involved in the role played by this transcendent exercise; on the contrary it is the reframing of the notion of the transcendent use of the faculties that itself effects a new realization of the transcendental project, one in which reason is granted more autonomy (as faculty of posing problems) than it was in Kant's realization of critique.

If, therefore, the aim of critique is to undertake the full realization of reason's power to problematize, then this will be fulfilled in Deleuzian critique through an account of the free relation of the faculties to their own proper object and then, on that basis, to each other. The "essential end" or "interest" that orients critique in the first place is no longer strictly ascribable to a faculty of 'reason' itself, rather the telos is ascribed firstly to the transcendent exercise of each faculty (having thus a "final power" [DR 143]), which each has its own kind of multiplicity, which in turn can only be apprehended as "problematic" by the faculty of thought, as the "faculty of problems in general." Thus not only is the autonomous
exercise of each of the faculties possible, but “there is a serial connection between the faculties” (DR 145), so that if each faculty can potentially be exercised in the face of its own proper multiplicity, then it is possible for each faculty in turn to relate itself freely to the transcendent exercise of each of the other faculties. “Between sensibility and imagination, between imagina-tion and memory, between memory and thought ... each disjointed faculty communicates to another the violence which carries it to its own limit” (DR 145). Furthermore, this “chain” or “fuse” can be traversed in a circular manner: Ideas “go from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility” (DR 146). Such a genesis of the autonomous relation of the faculties would give, in principle at least, an ultimately self-grounding form to transcendental empiricism. This genesis would not be echoed at the level of content, as in Hegel’s Phenomenology, but nevertheless it fulfils a formal requirement of metacritique: that a self-grounding genesis be possible. In fact it opens up a new conception of Bildung, in which the subject-apprentice no longer recollects the universal history that constitutes him but is rather individuated through developing the problem-Idea that constrains him.

Finally, in order to perform a metacritically valid procedure, one has to show how one’s common sense starting point can also be incorporated as a result into the unfolding of the structure of the critique. Deleuze fulfils this criterion by taking as a premise the notion that knowledge and conceptual recognition itself rests on the posing of problems, that knowledge is a result of the setting of problems. If this is the case, then it is possible to argue that the transcendent exercise of each faculty is required to force cognition into activity in the first place. This is what Deleuze means when he writes that “there is only involuntary thought” (DR 139). The closest analogy here is probably the Freudian idea that children only initially come to consciousness through the insistence of certain unanswerable questions: Where do I come from? Why are boys and girls different? From a Deleuzian point of view, such questions are structured like Kantian Ideas—How does a world begin? Where is an existing God?—they incite thought but cannot be satisfactorily answered by empirical cognition. Hence the insistent ‘why?’ of the child bores a hole into their empirical apprehension of the world that arouses a thirst for knowledge that cannot be satisfied by the answers that are available from social representatives of the world. In this way, the genesis of finite cognition would depend on the incursion of Ideas into the hitherto habitual experience of the child. Deleuze would follow Lacan in arguing that such a genesis is not a mere empirical fact of child development but involves a structure through which finite beings, for whom learning answers to problems is structurally prior to processes of recognition, must pass. “It is
from learning, not from knowledge, that the transcendental conditions of thought must be drawn" (DR 166).

Commonsense experience is thus by right a result of a process that is truly apprehended only from the point of view of genesis—an effect that, if isolated from this critical process, has the status of an 'abstraction' (in the Hegelian sense). Both 'experience' and cognition in general are ultimately generated through developing and responding to problems or Ideas, a process that is itself only correctly understood once the "critical method" has been grasped.  

Notes


6 It should be pointed out that there are two different interpretative tendencies concerning 'metacritique' in the literature on post-Kantianism. On the one hand, it is taken in a purely formal signification to mean that dimension of critical and post-Kantian philosophy which is concerned with its own justification. See, for instance, L. W. Beck, "Toward a Meta-critique of Pure Reason" in Essays on Kant and Hume, edited by L. W. Beck (New Haven: Yale, 1978); G. Zöller, "From Critique to Metacritique: Fichte's Transformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism," in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy, edited by S. Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 139–42. On the other hand, philosophers in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition tend to place the weight of the problem on the philosophical requirement to account for the historically situated aspect of critical procedure. For instance, in Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann, 1972), chs. 1–2, Habermas starts from a formal approach to metacritique but then seeks a predominantly sociohistorical solution of it; cf. also Garbis Kortian, Metacritique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
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28–33; Gillian Rose, *Hegel contra Sociology* (London: Athlone, 1981), 35, 40; and for an overview, Peter Osborne, "Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and Society," in *Radical Philosophy* 32 (1983): 8–15. The historicizing use of the term ‘metacritique’ can in fact lay claim to be the oldest, descending from Hamann and Herder. Deleuze provides only sketches of a possible historical metacritique in *Difference and Repetition*; the accent is on the formal dimension.


8 See my "The Vertigo of Philosophy: Deleuze and the Problem of Immanence," in *Radical Philosophy* 113 (May/June 2002), together with the ensuing exchange in vol. 114 (July/August 2002).


12 Keith Ansell Pearson has taken the biophilosophical reading of Deleuze furthest. Cf *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze* (London: Routledge, 1999); for a critical synopsis of this book, see my review in *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology* 32/3 (October 2001).


14 *Logic of Sense* (1969) is a somewhat anomalous work in Deleuze's career. After building up from 1953 onward with a series of interconnected studies (all centered around themes of 'difference' and 'repetition'), arriving at *Difference and Repetition* in 1968, why did Deleuze suddenly recast his philosophical terminology a year later in *Logic of Sense*? The concepts of difference and repetition are absent, and the references to Kant and post-Kantianism also disappear. This shift needs to be explained, but although I do not attempt to do so here, I think many aspects of *Logic of Sense* (which is mostly about language and psychoanalysis) can be made to fit the picture presented here. I also do not deal here with Deleuze and Guattari's projects of the 1970s on capitalism and schizophrenia.


Beck, “Kant’s Letter to Herz,” in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, 22.

In the ‘precritical’ period, Kant does not make a difference in kind between understanding and reason; in the Inaugural Dissertation, written in Latin, the term ‘intellectus’ covers them both.

Kant presents ‘philosophy’ as the “system of all philosophical cognition” (CPR A838/B866), while ‘metaphysics’ is the “name [that] can also be given to all of pure philosophy including the critique” (CPR A841/B869). Kant elaborates on the role of critique in relation to metaphysics in the Metaphysik Mrongrouvius from 1783, where he suggests that critique forms the first part of metaphysics, of which the second part will be “the system of pure reason” (Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 117, Ak. 29:753). He further characterizes metaphysics as the “system of pure cognitions of reason through concepts” (ibid., 113, Ak. 29:750), while specifying that the critique of pure reason “investigate[s] the possibility of the pure cognitions of reason” (ibid., 114, Ak. 29:752).


“Every faculty of the mind one can attribute an interest, that is, a principle that contains the condition under which alone its exercise is promoted. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind but itself determines its own. The interest of its speculative use consists in the cognition of the object up to the highest apriori principles; that of its practical use consists in the determination of the will with respect to the final and complete end” (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, trans. M. Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 236; Ak. 5:119–20). This passage is important for Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant, and we will return to it later.

Hegel objects against Kant that we cannot begin a critique of cognition by simply presupposing separate sources of cognition and hope that this isolation of different elements is correctly perceived and settled, before we carry out the critical procedure itself. We can respond at this point by recalling that Hegel’s critique of Kant historically begins with an affirmation of the imagination as the “common root” of understanding and intuition and attempts to reconstruct on that basis an originary access to the kind of intellectual intuition whose very loss initiated Kant’s embarkation on the critical project. If it is right, as some critics maintain, that Hegel presupposes the actuality of some kind of intellectual intuition at the outset of his critique of Kant, then this may undermine the validity of his insistence that one cannot begin with a multiplicity of sources of cognition. Cf. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. W. Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: SUNY, 1977), 70–5. For criticism of an uncritical presence of intellectual intuition in Hegel, see Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 12, 20; Stanley Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel (New Haven: Yale, 1974), 266ff.; Manfred Frank, “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the Beginning of Marxian Dialectics,” Idealistic Studies 19
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(1989): 258. (The 'common root' interpretation is also of course followed by Heidegger in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.)

25 In the Jäsche Logic, comparison, reflection, and abstraction form the series of logical acts necessary to make or form concepts in general. This applies to the smallest empirical concepts, but also potentially to the highest metaphysical concepts, which concern Kant in the Amphiboly (Kant, Logic, trans. R. Hartmann [New York: Dover, 1974], 100).

26 Such a 'reflection' has at least equal claim to be treated as primordial for cognition as does Hegel's own self-reflective procedure. From this Kantian perspective, Hegel's phenomenological dialectic of self-consciousness presupposes that the elements distinguished and related must be on the same plane; its validity is vitiated by overlooking that there may be possible differences in kind between the elements related. In this regard, it is important to note that Kant does not explicitly correlate 'transcendental reflection' at all with the notion of transcendental apperception, as one might expect if one was approaching Kant with a post-Kantian expectation of the methodological primacy of self-reflexivity.

27 For the founding articulation of Kant's theory of the principle of 'determining reason', see Kant, A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, 11, Ak. 1:392f.

28 Kant, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, 211, Ak. 2:171.


30 An interpretative difficulty should be mentioned at this point. Kant's Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition portray the structure of Kant's philosophy in subtly different ways. This is particularly true with regard to the notion of faculty, which has only one meaning in the latter work. There, Deleuze aims to isolate the 'higher forms' of the faculties of sensibility, imagination, thought, etc. (although not of the understanding, for reasons to be explained). However, in Kant's Critical Philosophy, the 'higher form' refers not to the faculty in this sense but, as we shall see, to (e.g.) knowledge tout court (alongside desire and pleasure/pain). For one reason for this variation, see footnote 31 below. For another, having to do with Deleuze's critique of the model of representation that frames Kant's account of the faculties, see section 3 and footnote 37.

31 However, the legitimacy of this legislation is only secured in the Transcendental Deduction, which shows that the global form of sensible intuition (space and time as unities) necessarily makes intuition itself by right subject to the understanding (which is responsible for unifying representations). See CPR B150-165 and H. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale, 1983), 158-72 on this 'second half' of the Deduction. This ultimate collaboration of intuition and understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction can help explain why, when expounding Kant, Deleuze talks of the higher form of knowledge, but when extrapolating from and revising Kant, as
he does in *Difference and Repetition*, he permits himself to ascribe the higher form to the faculty itself. The latter path enables him to say, for instance, that the higher form of sensibility can tell us something independently of its functional correlation with the understanding in a Transcendental Deduction.

32 *KCP* 8. Although Deleuze does not include the imagination in his table, he discusses it immediately afterwards in the text, characterizing it minimally as the source of synthesis “taken in its activity,” differentiating it, for instance, from the understanding, which is the source of synthesis “taken in its unity” (*KCP* 9).

33 Cf. Allen Wood, *Kant’s Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) for a reading that shows how important the theory of ends is even for the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.


35 Cf. *DR* 56. Of course, the German *Vorstellung* does not imply any ‘re-’ or ‘taking up again’. Moreover, for Kant intuitions are also *Vorstellungen* in that they are *vor uns*; the subject is affected by them. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Kant himself was forced to assume a bare, internally differentiated spatiotemporal multiplicity at the outset of his discussion of the temporal syntheses (see *CPR* A98-9). As the Transcendental Aesthetic has proved that time and space are infinitely divisible, it is legitimate for Kant to assume a multiplicity that is prior to the syntheses of imagination and understanding that ‘take up’, or re-present that multiplicity as a multiplicity: "Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another" (*CPR* A99).


37 Ideas and intensity are the topics of two substantial chapters in *Difference and Repetition*, “The Ideal Synthesis of Difference” (translation modified), and “The Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible.”

38 In this article, I have focused on the synthesis of the Idea, but Deleuze also thinks there is a synthesis proper to intensive magnitudes themselves, as well as syntheses of imagination and memory that emerge due to the centrality of time for finite cognition.

39 In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze talks of pushing each component of experience “to the point where it goes beyond our own experience.” In Bergson this procedure involves the location of a difference in kind between the faculties of perception and memory, when taken as correlates of their proper objects (actual matter in the case of perception, and the preserved past in the case of memory): the move beyond experience invokes “an extraordinary broadening out that forces us to think a pure perception identical to the whole of matter, a
pure memory identical to the whole of the past” (Deleuze, Bergsonism, 27). The aim is again to rethink the sources and relations of the faculties within the composite that is empirical cognition, or experience, by untangling its sources, and “follow[ing] each of the ‘lines’ beyond the turn in experience” (ibid., 28). In Bergson, experience is a composite of perception and recollection, and the philosopher must separate these two elements and follow them in their ‘ideal’ state beyond experience.

In this way Deleuze attempts to smooth out the paradox in the important passage cited in footnote 23. Kant writes that “to every faculty of the mind one can attribute an interest, that is, a principle that contains the condition under which alone its exercise is promoted.” Yet “reason, as the faculty of principles” not only “determines the interest of all the powers of the mind but itself determines its own.” But if each faculty has its own principle and interest, it overdetermines matters considerably to have reason “determining” these interests and determining its own interest as some kind of ‘meta-faculty’. It is debatable how successful Deleuze’s attempt to resolve this issue is, as he writes that “Ideas occur throughout the faculties and concern them all” (DR 193), while simultaneously claiming that they “have a very special relationship to pure thought” (DR 194). The problem only becomes pressing if one wants to emphasize Deleuze’s remarks about the teleology involved in the faculties (as I do, and as he does explicitly in earlier works such as Proust and Signs).

The ignition of this “fuse” (DR 193) does not happen according to a uniform temporality or even at the level of empirical real time at all. Psychoanalysis provides a good model for understanding how different the process of transcendental empiricism can be from commonsense experience. It also exemplifies the initial passivity of much transcendental empiricism. An intensive sensation undergone by a child at the hands of an other may, when remembered, force their imagination to construct a fantasy based around it (for instance, a fantasy of seduction). Deleuze writes that the transcendent exercise of the imagination is the fantasy, “which is both that which can only be imagined and the empirically unimaginable” (DR 144). Lacan has shown how fantasies tend to be structured around a peculiar object (the objet a) that cannot be empirically represented. For instance, exhibitionistic fantasies are articulated around “the gaze” as an enigmatic ‘object’ that stands in for the impossibility of seeing myself as the Other sees me. “In exhibitionism what is intended by the subject is what is realised in the other” (Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. A. Sheridan [London: Penguin, 1979], 183. Cf. 67–119 on the gaze). During the psychoanalytic process itself, it may become apparent that this fantasy is nothing but a palimpsest of memories, again articulated around a paradoxical transcendent object of memory that was never lived for itself (the moment of seduction being only actualized by ‘deferred action’). At the end of the psychoanalytic process, the analysand is able to think freely about the psychopathological content in such a way that they can detach the structure that has been determining them from what their experience has felt like from within that structure. In this example of transcendental empiricism we can see clearly how what is initially a passive transcendent exercise becomes active at the
higher levels of memory and thought.

42 Deleuze notes that in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant provides a model for the genesis of the relations of the faculties, notably in the case of the imagination and reason in the sublime, where the imagination is forced to exceed its own limits by reason (DR 321). In the sublime, "our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea" (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. W. Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987], # 25, Ak. 5:250f). In thus exceeding its own limits, it paradoxically encounters its "vocation" (ibid., # 28, Ak. 5:262); it could be said to encounter its own end or object in problematic form. Imagination is oriented by the violent apprehension of its ultimate relation with reason.

43 This is not intended to suggest that 'problems' are ultimately relative to culture or to individuals. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze affirms Marxism and psychoanalysis as the best approaches to 'social' and 'psychic' Ideas respectively. The systems inaugurated by Marx and Freud, however, had to wait until Althusser and Lacan for their truly 'critical' formulations, which required a rigorous separation of the symbolic and imaginary elements in their respective fields. The structuralist revision of Marx and Freud thus involved the isolation of fundamental differences in kind in order to discern in their purity the ideal structures that govern human experience, unencumbered by the confusion that arises from the mixture in experience of these different elements (e.g., in ideology or morality).

44 On conceptual representation as an effect, see DR 145.

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