This piece is written as referent thesis for discussion in framework of “The European evenings” organized by European Union Information Center.

1. The notion "liberal democracy" has become a widely used term. Like many such terms it is often applied without further thinking about its possible content and used to describe various different phenomena. In most cases "liberal democracy" is understood as a synonym for such terms as "modern democracy", "contemporary democracy", "Western democracy" etc.

2. The common usage of the term "liberal democracy" has generated the perception that the concepts of "liberalism" and "democracy" are inseparable. If this is correct, then democracy in all its forms of expression must be liberal, but liberalism in its turn must be democratic.

3. But while attempting to ascertain what the terms liberalism and democracy mean not only the contradictions between these terms become clear, but also the fact that they often exclude each other.

a) The term "democracy" describes a form of governing society or a political regime. The term "liberalism" in its turn characterises the aggregate of particular perceptions and values. In its wider meaning liberalism can be characterised as an ideology, though the rationalism that is inherent to liberalism is inconsistent with the essence of an ideologies practising homo credens.

b) Democracy as the embodiment of a "common will" can become inconsistent with the principle of individualism defended by liberalism. If liberalism manifests liberty, then democracy - equality. Attempts to achieve the simultaneous realisation of both mentioned values were the basis of all historical conflicts.

4. Apparently there is no necessary link between democracy and liberalism. The opposite of liberalism is totalitarianism, while of democracy - authoritarianism, hence, at least theoretically, there can exist a "totalitarian democracy" and a "liberal authoritarianism".

5. It is asserted, that the values of liberalism are liberty, tolerance, privacy, constitutionalism and the rule of law (representation and separation of powers). If liberty is the main value of liberalism, then three questions must be answered - Liberty from what? Liberty to do what? Liberty for whom?

a) "Liberty from what?" (negative liberty) - in liberalism is understood as the freedom to act without external restrictions (Hobbes) - without the interference of the state in the activities of individual.

b) "Liberty to do what?" (positive liberty) - less emphatic in liberalism, as it depends on the unequal distribution of resources, and its consequent realisation is possible only by restricting negative liberty.

c) "Liberty for whom?" - in liberalism is the question of citizenry. Classical liberalism means only freedom for individuals who are capable to make independent and rational decisions, meaning individuals who are materially independent from other individuals. Here the relativity of the democracy of liberalism finds expression - democracy only for the few.

6. The growth of production caused by capitalism has led to the increase of living standards in the Western world. Hence the number of seemingly materially independent individuals has increased. Through the development of production and the growth of material wealth Western society has become an educated society. That has lead to an increase in demands and self-confidence of individuals. As a result of this historic process the citizenry of the Western world has broadened to cover the whole society.

7. As a result we attain the situation where all members of society are "individuals" with natural rights. To realise and protect these natural rights "individuals" are endowed with political rights. To describe the political framework which maintains this situation, usually the term "liberal democracy" is used.

8. As in the Western world citizenry covers the whole society, the natural rights of individuals have transformed into "human rights". The process of decolonization and the collapse of the bipolar model resulted in the emergence of the idea of a united "humanity" as "citizenry".

9. One of the basic values that characterise liberalism is tolerance. In politics it is represented in the form of the principle of value neutrality - the "indifference" of the state towards the opinions, life styles etc. of individuals. The roots of this neutrality of the state are found in the secularisation of Western society - the separation of the church from the state. But this tolerance is problematic:

a) It is difficult to separate opinions from actions (for example, at what point should the expression of racist views be qualified as an act that has caused consequences in the real world, which means - action).

b) Does "value neutrality" mean the "indifference" of the state or is it the indifference of the great majority of individuals who form society (for example, in the beginning of Western modernity secularisation and as a consequence religious tolerance was possible only in connection with the spread of ideas of rationalism and the increase of indifference within society towards religion).

c) There is a basis for the assumption, that "value neutrality" can be ascribed only to those areas, which are "extruded” from the public sphere into the private sphere, meaning to such processes which have lost their "public evaluation" and maintain their value only for separate individuals or groups of individuals. These values do not require special state protection (for example, various sexual practices).

d) In issues that are vitally important for society "value neutrality" is not only impossible but also notional and logical nonsense.

10. The concept of privacy has created a sphere, in which it is possible to realise the "negative liberties" proponed by liberalism. The sphere, in which a human being can really become an individual (a self-sufficient being). This privacy is a sphere exclusively characteristic to Western society.

11. The self-insufficiency of the individual in the public sphere, the incapability to exist in natural conditions (irrespectively from interpretations of these conditions in different traditions) creates the necessity for the State. The constitutionalism of liberals in its turn is the institutional framework of the State, which is created to secure the values postulated by liberals. It is only of instrumental character and has no value on its own.

12. It is known that the world's resources are restricted, what could not be said about the needs of human beings. Since the UN Environment conference in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro it is no secret to anyone that in order to provide the contemporary living standards of the richest countries for all inhabitants of the planet it would require the resources of at least three earth planets. Another commonly known fact is that the 20% of rich countries use 80% resources of the planet.

13. The global climate changes, environmental pollution and the diminution of the ozone layer in the nineties have attained a notable place in the agenda of international politics. The dangers created by these factors have increased at such rate that it has obtained the character of a universal threat. There are three possible ways to combat these dangers:

a) to restrict those human activities which cause these dangers;

b) to stop or reduce the harm caused by these dangers;

c) to artificially approximate the existing situation to its natural condition.

14. All these ways will require an unprecedented concentration of resources. Such a potential mobilisation of resources inevitably means that:

a) Any redistribution of resources in favour of underprivileged countries is impossible, because the "capability of altruism of humans is restricted" (David Ricardo). Quite on the opposite, there can emerge the necessity for "the wealthiest" to deprive the 80% "have-nots" of the approximately 20% of global resources that they still have.

b) The restriction of those human activities that cause dangers, most likely, firstly will restrict the activities of citizens in underprivileged countries.

c) Harm caused by ecological threats will be compensated for only for citizens of rich countries.

d) Artificial approximation of the existing situation to the natural condition, most believably, firstly will occur in rich countries or in favour of citizens of these countries.

15. The unequal redistribution of resources will facilitate the cyclisation of revisionistic international politics in countries which are most lacking resources, what in its turn will evoke much more conflicts than in the period of the Cold war.

16. Incisive conflicts caused by the oncoming redistribution of resources will contribute to the necessity to separate “us” from “them”. The concentration of resources and their usage to avert the untraditional threat in its turn will unavoidably require:

a) the mobilisation of society;

b) provision of appropriate value reference-points;

c) attaining of adequate efficiency and promptitude.

17. But who of the actors operating in the international system will undertake this mobilising role? Most likely - these will be the industrially well-developed superpowers. Since the transformation of the EU from an interstate organisation into a united State has finally started, the coming EU will be one of these superpowers.

18. There is no doubt that a superpower undertaking this mobilising role:

a) on the one hand, might correct its domestic political regime to successfully realise the new global mission;

b) on the other hand, the implementation of the mission per se will correct the existing political regime.

19. The prospective corrections, most believably, must favour intellectual reflection about the political regime of the Western world and its future.

20. Most regretably, the dominant polit-correct discourse restricts this reflection by its defined thematical scope as well as by its offered concepts and terminology.

21. In the EU there are already questioned at least three of the institutional basic principles of liberal democracy:

a) The principle of the separations of powers is ignored (the division of powers of the European parliament and the European commission).

b) The principle of representation is not strictly observed (the mechanism of delegation of representatives to the European parliament and the European commission).

c) The interests of the minority are not respected (Haider's scandal and the threats expressed towards Italy on the subject of the eventual results of the elections of the parliament in 2001).

22. While the EU is existing as an interstate organisation its institutional system is fragile and of temporal character. It is condemned to head towards the creation of a federal European State endued with the attribute of a sovereignty or otherwise - to disintegrate, while forcing Europe into the chaos created by contrasting nationalistic forces. The necessity to harmonise the opinions of 15 independent states, on the one hand creates difficulties in decision-making, on the other it makes the implementation of these decisions doubtful. The situation, that EU decisions do not proceed as a result of a traditional legislative process in its turn leads to the alienation between the institutions of the EU and its citizens.

23. Initiatives of the last months by Gerhard Schröder are seemingly evidence for the desire to remodel the institutional model of the EU according to the principles of a liberal democracy:

a) the delegation of the legislative power to a bicameral parliament and its separation from the executive power - the European commission, which will become the EU government;

b) the creation of a government (the European commission) responsible to the parliament;

c) the creation of the parliament's second chamber as an institution to protect the interests of the minority (national states);

d) the securing of the principles of constitutionalism by introducing a united EU constitution.

24. Nevertheless the offered models of transforming the EU, most likely, are testifying not so much about the desire to provide (to maintain) the principles of a liberal democracy in its institutions as about the aim to modify the EU from an interstate organisation to a European Superstate (ES).

25. Looking back on the history of the Western world, we can partially differentiate between three periods:

a) the pre-imperial antique state;

b) the late imperial antique state as well as the feudal state;

c) the national state.

26. Grounding on historical experience, the assumption can be raised that the existence of democracy depends on whether the borders of a state as a political organisation do or do not coincide with the boundaries of a society (i.e. does a state include one or several societies). The EU becoming a superpower will include a number of societies.

27. The modern political theory too questions the possibility that the political regime of the ES will be democratic in its previous notion. Arend Lijphart has formulated nine preconditions for the foundation of a consociation democracy in plural societies (because the forming of a classical democracy in a plural society is unlikely):

a) the non-existence of a segment (sets of individuals that are representing organised or unorganised groups which differ in linguistic, religious, ethnic etc. features or express varying opinions or interests) that forms the total majority;

b) the social-economic equality among segments;

c) the approximately equal size of the segments, that would allow to secure the balance of powers among them;

d) the restricted number of groups so that negotiations among them do not become a too complex process;

e) the comparatively small state-size that simplifies the process of decision-making;

f) the existence of an external threat that strengthens of internal unity;

g) the existence of common orientations for all segments of society that softens the specific orientations of the different segments;

h) the accommodation of population groups which form specific segments in compact units which if necessary allows to turn to federalism as a form to provide autonomy;

i) the existence of historical traditions of attaining compromises and agreements.

28. Only the last four of the above mentioned factors will be immanent to the ES. But considering that the enumeration of factors is given in declining order from most important to those of less importance, it can be predicted that the most important preconditions to shape a consociation democracy will not exist in the ES.

29. What then will be the political regime of the superstate? The stated reasons (various threats; the necessity of the consolidation of society; the necessity of mobilisation of resources; the necessity to maximise the institutional capacity) require the creation of an effective and at the same time legitimate model of governing society.

30. Such a model could combine in itself the effectiveness of making and implementing decisions and universalism characteristic to totalitarianism as well as the procedure of providing legitimacy and the post factum public "expertise" of a realised policy characteristic to democracy.

31. The task of the state as a political instrument is to provide, protect and enhance the quality of life of its citizens, which is formed of the totality of positive identities of an individual. What place will be preserved for the values voiced by liberalism that now have become an indispensable constituent of the identity of a "Western person"?

32. Apparently, the at the present observable retreat of liberalism to the private sphere will continue. Although the citizenry of the ES will have to abdicate from a part of its sovereignty what concerns the so-called "high" politics - foreign affairs, security and macroeconomics -, the former civil liberties will be preserved in the sphere of "low" politics. In a range of spheres the control by the state will even diminish. This process can be called "the extended secularisation". As in the separation of the church from the state, now the ethnic belonging, the sexual practises (that does not exclude the transmission of reproductive functions to the public sphere), the biological self- support (euthanasia, drug-use etc.) and the like will be delivered to the complete individual self-control.

33. The diminishing role of liberalism in the public sphere logically erases from the prospective decrease of the importance of private property:

a) With the virtualisation of the process of desire-fulfilment the necessary amount of resources for the separate individual will decrease.

b) On the other hand with the rising costs of the reality, as we are constrained to reason according to the theory of rational choice, the majority of individuals will choose the cheapest possibility to fulfil its desires.

34. The present welfare state, which is rooted in the tradition created by Rousseau rather than by Anglo-Saxon liberals, will be replaced by a new social policy, which will be based not so much on the redistribution of social goods as on the development of new technologies.

35. The new political regime could be called the new social contract mutually entered into by individuals in circumstances where the unrestricted enlargement of the "citizenry" and the transcendentalisation of human rights again have led to the natural condition - all war against all.

36. Of course, there are many contradictions in these presented ideas. But this is only one attempt to look at the future political processes without the constraints of political correctness. After all, the aim of the discussion is not to convince somebody of something, but to stimulate the exchange of views and to arouse further reflection…

See the Latvian version of the text

JH